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Abstract
Nigeria is arguably the largest importer of dairy products in Africa. Available statistics shows that up to 98% 
of the total dairy products consumed in the country are imported; and that about 75% of the entire dairy 
market is controlled by FrieslandCampina WAMCO (FCW). The purpose of this study is to examine the 
basis for the prevailing import orientation in the dairy industry since 1973. Is the orientation traceable to 
operations of multinational companies or the institutional and governance challenges in the country? Using 
triangulated data collected from FCW official reports and other relevant sources, and a content analytical 
technique, the study finds that the problem in the industry is multifaceted. Central to the challenges are 
persistent institutional and infrastructural defects, as well as faulty integration designs adopted by FCW. 
Based on this, the paper recommends that reversing the current trend requires government’s policies that 
dis-incentivizes importation. However, such policies can work only when the right atmosphere for cattle 
farming and local dairy production is put in place.
Keywords: FrieslandCampina, MNCs, dairy industry, local value chain, integration, government policies, 
Nigeria.
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1. Introduction
The dairy industry in Nigeria provides an interesting premise for studying the microcosm of multinational 
business engagements in Africa. This is especially with respect to examining the dynamics and consequences 
of the spatial difference between sources of production inputs and multinational business interests. Right 
from the colonial era, the industry has remained foreign-oriented in terms of the sources of its raw material 
and semi-finished factor inputs (Nwoko, 1988). This has effectively constrained the development of the 
local value chain and the delivery on the developmental mandate of employment creation and skills transfer 
(Okojie, 2018). A dominant thesis in the literature is that the preference of dairy multinational companies 
(MNCs) for imported factor inputs can be explained by the persistent weakness in the governance and 
regulatory institutions, as well as the increasing costs of doing business in Nigeria (The Economist, 2015). 
For the MNCs, importation of non-mineral inputs, semi-finished and finished goods thus become a popular 
business strategy. The implication is that over the past years, local production systems are either non-existent 
or poorly integrated into the global business value chain.
The failure of the local value chain to contribute meaningfully to national development manifests in the 
persistence of cluttered livestock enterprise – in the form of transhumance pastoralism. Not only does 
transhumance pastoralism bring about low cow milk production, its traditional practice has also been 
threatened by climate change and Fulani Herdsmen insurgency. Increasing incidence of climate change 
induces a north-to-south migration of cattle farmers in desperate search for grazing grounds beyond their 
traditional home-grounds. Such southward movement has brought about incessant clashes and escalation 
of tensions between herdsmen and grazing communities, which in turn makes the business of cow breeding 
and herding very primitive and risky. This is also coupled with the difficulty imposed by the dearth of basic 
infrastructure like roads, electricity, and reticulated water supply across the length and breadth of the country, 
which makes milk collection and processing highly inefficient.
A number of government programmes designed to encourage local dairy value chain development and make the 
country self-sufficient in milk production yielded little results. The recent attempt to develop cattle colonies in 
all regions of the country to quell herdsmen insurgence and boost milk production, for instance, was met with 
stiff community resistance (Akinnaso, 2018). The colonies, according to the country’s agricultural minister, 
are designed to enable the herdsmen ‘feed their livestock’, without having ‘to disturb the fertile agricultural 
lands that belong to farming communities’ (Orji, 2018). Government programmes in this direction, even in 
cases where they were not resisted, failed to make any meaningful impact in the development of local dairy 
productive capacity. Instead, the dairy industry remains dominated by a few dairy MNCs, which though 
incorporated as manufacturing outfits, are more inclined to practices that allow them import finished and 
semi-finished dairy products through their global value chains. While this strategy undoubtedly serves the 
profit interests of the MNCs, local dairy production remains undermined. The status quo raises questions as 
to: how the MNCs survived for so many years working contrary to national development goals? By what 
mechanisms are they able to resist government-backed backward integration policies?
These questions, no doubt, bother on the theoretical contestation around the operations of MNCs in Africa. On 
one side, the argument is that MNCs bring development to their host economies, and so should be supported 
and incentivized by the government (Asiedu, 2002; Iamsiraroj, 2016). On the other hand, they are despised as 
western tools for exploitation and expropriation (Carmody, 2017; Udofia, 1984). Local production capacities 
flourish in industrial sectors where the operations of MNCs are backwardly integrated into the local dairy 
value chain. On the other hand, the capacity is compromised where MNCs practice forward integration that 
allows them to import factor inputs and semi-finished products from their global value chain actors.
Although reliance on importation is considered part of the attempts by the MNCs to preserve positive 
profits amidst local production challenges, the actions of the MNCs under such circumstance have equally 
been linked to increased rent-seeking behaviour and other forms of manipulative practices (Deininger and 
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about the accusation of MNCs influencing national policies and regulations as a protection over their rent-
seeking behaviour (Zhu, 2017), and of using corporate social responsibilities (CSR) as a tool for mitigating 
arising hostility risks (Aqueveque et al., 2018).
While this kind of theoretical contestation dominate public debate about the role of MNCs in the development 
of Africa’s local industrial bases, few case-by-case evidence exist in the literature to explain its microcosmic 
nature. Previous studies tend to broadly link MNCs to practices that widen the spatial distance between their 
commercial interests and the development needs of their host economies (Phelps, 2008). Such studies however 
suffer from generalization bias, by failing to identify the specificities of multinational business actions and 
the consequences of such in the development of local value chains. As an attempt to close this gap, our 
study makes use of the case of FrieslandCampina WAMCO (henceforth FCW) operations in Nigeria. The 
FCW case allows us to explore key issues relating to the extent to which the operations of MNCs converge 
or diverge from the host country’s local value chain; and the justifications for the back-and-forth shift in 
integration policies among MNCs.
Our choice of FCW is informed by the fact that the company controls about 75% of dairy market in Nigeria, 
which arguably is the largest importer of dairy products in Africa. Nigeria imports about 98% of the total 
dairy products consumed in the country (Punch Newspaper, 2016a) and spends an average of US$1.3 billion 
yearly on such importation (Business Day, 2019). This statistics confirms that the successes recorded by 
FCW in the industry can largely be attributed to its import operations. Given its long years of operations in 
Nigeria, the FCW case study enriches debate on the paradox of multinational business survival in turbulent 
business environment. What is today known as FCW was incorporated in Nigeria as the West African Milk 
Company Nigeria Limited (WAMCO) in 1973 and as private limited liability company for the manufacture, 
processing, packing and distribution of various dairy products in the country. Prior to the establishment 
of FCW, FrieslandCampina products were already being exported to Nigeria. Its most popular product in 
Nigeria – Peak Milk – was first sold in the country in 1954 (FrieslandCampina, 2011).
2. Theoretical contestation and the context of diary production in Nigeria
2.1 The theoretical contestation
The primary goal of import substitution industrialization strategies, in most countries where they are practice, 
is to deepen domestic production and reduce dependency on importation (Adewale, 2017). In pursuance of 
this goal, countries institute different incentive and protection schemes designed to guarantee local industry 
development. For foreign firms operating in the affected countries, the expectation is that they would be able 
to contribute towards developing the local industrial bases and by so doing generate some welfare economic 
gains in the forms of employment generation, skills transfer, and increased local productivity. In most of 
the countries, particularly those in Africa, this expectation is hardly met. MNCs in such environment have 
instead been accused of pursuing profit interests in a way that runs contrary to host government’s industrial 
development agenda, leaving most of the countries in chronically debased industrial condition (Gui-Diby 
and Renard, 2015). Weak industrial base makes countries vulnerable to chronic import dependency, even in 
sectors where they are abundantly endowed with the requisite raw materials (Gui-Diby and Renard, 2015; 
Taylor, 2016).
Under such circumstance, MNCs are usually left with two options, to organize transactions vertically within 
their internal structures or horizontally within the market structure (Geyskens et al., 2006; Madhok, 1997). 
Although the classical transaction cost theory assumes that the market structure is a more efficient option for 
organizing transactions (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981), the preference, in the case of MNCs’ operations, is 
weakened by the fact that being foreign imposes higher transaction costs (Hennart, 1991). This is in addition 
to the fact that in some developing countries, preference for internalization (vertical integration) is heightened 
by high level of informality in the source markets and the associated contract uncertainty (Geyskens et al., 
















































































International Food and Agribusiness Management Review
58
Ekumankama et al. Volume 23, Issue 1, 2020
integration depends on the strength of the governance institutions, availability of supportive infrastructure, 
and the conduciveness of the policy and regulatory environments.
In the absence of viable government incentives and supports, as in the case of Nigeria, MNCs tend to 
disconnect themselves from the more expensive and less efficient local value chain, and to use their stronger 
market power to manipulate governments’ policy directives in favour of liberalization policies that encourage 
importation (Kapfer, 2006). In Nigeria, high defragmentation of the local input sources makes any form 
of horizontal integration outside of the MNCs near impossible; and the absence of strong institutions (e.g. 
effective property rights enforcement) imposes extra costs against any single MNCs relying on local production 
inputs. The environment of business transactions in the country is largely uncertain and risky, and policy 
instability raises the risk of expropriation.
The relevant institutional frameworks in place to address the problem of expropriation are either weak or 
deliberately undermined. In such environment, rent-seeking characterizes the behaviour of MNCs and other 
large-scale firms (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010). The tendency of MNCs indulging in rent-seeking to offset 
high cost of transaction increases to a scale that can undermine local production (Auty, 2007). Sustaining 
this rent-seeking behaviour as a strategy for profit maximization leads MNCs into seeking influence in the 
policy making and legislative processes, at the detriment of local value chain development (Lodge, 2018; 
Zhu, 2017). Along this line, therefore, our study hypothesizes that the persistent underdevelopment of the 
Nigerian local dairy value chain is traceable to rent-seeking practices by the dominant MNCs in the dairy 
industry.
2.2 Background issues in milk production in Nigeria
To understand the challenges and opportunities inherent in the Nigerian dairy industry, there is need to first 
analyse the peculiarities in the industry, especially with reference to the historical attempts at its development, 
government policy actions, and multinational agribusiness activities. The very nature of the industry in 
Nigeria creates strong incentives for foreign businesses with well developed global value chain, while at 
the same time constituting drawbacks against the development of the local dairy industry. That the Nigerian 
government has over the past years done little to correct the imbalances raises issues as to whether the 
unproductive nature of the dairy value chain is attributable to the activities of foreign firms or the constrains 
that characterise the country’s business environment.
In the business of dairy farming and processing, the Nigerian market is arguably the most fragmented. Up 
to 95% of all locally produced milk in the country come from smallholder farmers, with little progress made 
in the areas of cooperative formation, commercial dairy farming and milk production. Although the country 
is among the top 15 countries in terms of the population of cows according to the 2013 FAO World Cattle 
Inventory (Figure 1), milk production in the country stands at barely one litre of milk per day per cow. Even 
the minimal milk production takes place in the remote rural areas with no linkage, no access road, no water, 
and no electricity. This means that the little milk produced locally hardly gets to the urban markets where 
it is mostly needed (Nwoko, 1988). The disconnection between rural production and urban market implies 
that rising prices and marginal gains in the urban market do not significantly impact the prices of rural dairy 
products – thus providing additional crowding out effect against local production. Urban plants do not also 
source milk from local producers because the transaction cost of doing so is enormous. In the words of one 
of the operators, for instance:
Three or four years ago we used to fly our milk down to Lagos…It cost a fortune. The milk would 
spoil sitting in the airport. We had to pay off customs. It was a nightmare. Nowadays, the firm uses 
costly refrigerated trucks instead. Drivers must brave day-long journeys on disintegrating roads. 
Each truck requires about 200,000 naira ($1000) in opaque license fees every month 
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Skewed spatial distribution of dairy cow and the large size of Nigeria’s population arguably makes the 
country the largest untapped dairy markets in Africa. Dairy farming and pasturing is seen largely in the 
country as an exclusive occupational preserve of the Fulanis in the rural parts of Northern Nigeria (Sutter, 
1987). Unsuccessful efforts by the government to link the rural dairy markets to the more advanced (though 
import-dependent) urban markets were largely due to the high costs of transacting along the local value 
chain. Unfortunately, those earlier efforts were marred by government policy inconsistency vis-à-vis the 
removal of import restrictions on imported dairy products (Nwoko, 1988), and the adoption of a structural 
adjustment programme (SAP) in 1986. SAP led to the influx of cheaper imports with price advantage over 
locally produced milk (Jansen, 1992). Since the abolition of SAP in 1996, no further policy effort was made 
by the government to either protect or incentivize local milk production.
Private sector efforts at repositioning the dairy industry are also less impactful, largely because milk and 
other dairy products importation favour the few MNCs that control the Nigerian market (Ilu et al., 2016). 
This claim is supported by the evidence shown in Table 1, which indicates that FCW and five other foreign 
firms control up to 99% of the entire dairy market. Incidentally, these foreign firms are importing and selling 
processed dairy products, or at best importing milk powder and reconstituting it into liquid milk and other 
dairy products such as yoghurt, ice cream and confectioneries (Ilu et al., 2016).
Ironically, for as long as the status quo remained, the Nigerian government thought it less desirable to come 
up with any coherent policy for local dairy development (McCulloch et al., 2017; Jansen, 1992). At best, the 
only known explicit dairy industry regulation in the country is the yet-to-be-passed Milk and Dairy Products 
Regulations 2018, drafted by the country’s National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control 
(NAFDAC). The proposed regulation is limited only to ensuring that ‘no milk or dairy products shall be 
manufactured, imported, exported, advertised, sold or distributed in Nigeria, unless it has been registered 
in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations’ (NAFDAC). There is nothing in the regulation to 
either deter milk importation or incentivize domestic production.













Table 1. Market share of dairy companies in Nigeria (based on 2016 retail value RSP) (PCW, 2017).
Companies Home country Shares
FrieslandCampina WAMCO Nigeria Plc The Netherlands 74.5%
Nutricima Pz The United Kingdom 7.0%
National Food Industries Co Ltd Saudi Arabia 5.1%
Sosaco Nigeria Ltd India 4.8%
CHI Ltd The Netherlands 4.0%
PZ Industries Plc The United Kingdom 3.5%
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2.3 Evidence on the integration role of multinational companies in the diary business
A number of factors combine to determine the extent to which the operations of MNCs can contribute to 
the development of their host economies. First is the degree of integration and cooperation with indigenous 
business operators. Evidence from Dries et al. (2009) reveals that an integration approach that supports the 
flow of raw materials and other factor inputs from local businesses to MNCs can yield the desired benefits of 
skills transfer and productive employment creation. Essentially, effective integration offers MNCs opportunities 
to provide strategic bridging between the markets and the local smallholder farmers (Chagwiza et al., 2016; 
Sharma et al., 1994). On the other hand, poor integration results to a situation where the presence and the 
operations of foreign firms crowd out local businesses, essentially due to the latter’s inability to meet with 
higher standards and market imperfections (Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Murigu et al., 2018).
Secondly, government interventions can aid the achievement of ‘an appropriate balance between inter-company 
coordination (to protect the investments of large firms from opportunistic activity by smaller competitors) 
and competition (to promote efficiency and equitable prices paid to smallholders)’ (Poulton et al., 2006). 
Herath and Weesink (2009), in the case of the Sri Lankan Tea Sector, showed how government intervention 
was able to reduce transaction cost and improve coordination arrangements within the sector. Specifically, 
government policies and interventions can incentivize MNCs to support local businesses, which have been 
proven in the cases of countries with strong government dairy development incentives (see for instance Dries 
and Swinnen, 2004). On the other hand, absence of effective government intervention, in the East African 
region, was identified by Omondi et al. (2017) as being key among the problems militating against dairy 
sector innovation and development.
Thirdly, in an economy dominated by struggling small and informal businesses, the activities of MNCs face 
greater antagonisms, which in turn constrains the role of the latter in local economic development. When 
the number of small local suppliers is high and their locations disperse, foreign investors tend to switch 
relationship to a handful of concentrated large-scale suppliers as a strategy for minimizing transaction costs 
– an approach that is proven to be responsible for the rapid exclusion of many small suppliers (Dries and 
Swinnen, 2004). Under this circumstance, MNCs perceive their relationship with local businesses not as a 
partnership model, but as a social responsibility model.
By examining an integration effort of a multinational company in the presence of complexities such as poor 
infrastructure, and absence of supportive government policies and interventions, this paper presents a new 
insight to investors, policymakers, and researchers. Central to this insight is the need for rethinking, in a 
mutually benefiting manner, the link between MNC operations and local dairy value chain development in 
Africa.
3. The Friesland Campina Case
3.1 Sources and methods of data collection
The unit of our data collection and case analysis is FCW and its Dairy Development Programme (DDP) in 
Nigeria. The programme was initiated in August 2010 as the first practical attempt at mainstreaming smallholder 
cattle farmers into the national dairy value chain. According to information contained in the programme’s 
website, its focus is ‘on sharing knowledge and expertise by means of training, knowledge partnerships and 
initiating and supporting projects aimed at improving the dairy farming infrastructure’ (FrieslandCampina,. 
2019). The company’s DDP is accepted by the Nigerian government as a viable model for developing the 
dairy sector in the country. Its implementation was claimed to have earned FCW the prize of being the best 
CSR Company in West Africa in 2015 (Punch Newspaper, 2016b).
Our field data collection took place between 2016 and 2017. In line with Kilelu et al. (2017), we used 
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procedure and reliability of the study outcomes. Annual reports and official releases of FCW were among 
the major sources of data used for the analysis. Another source of data applied was a focus group discussion, 
based on a stakeholders’ advocacy workshop organized from 29th June to 1st July 2016. The participants 
covered dairy farmers from three states in the South Western part of Nigeria (made up of Ondo, Oyo, and 
Osun states), representatives from a cross-section of industries operating within the dairy value chain, and 
representatives from relevant government agencies. The workshop provided opportunity for face-to-face 
interaction and cross-fertilization of diverging positions among the relevant stakeholders.
There was also a dairy farmers’ questionnaire specifically designed to elicit qualitative data from predominantly 
illiterate cattle breeders and dairy farmers. A total of 250 local dairy farmers who officially identified with 
the DDP of FCW were contacted through hired field assistants. Due to the limited literacy of the sampled 
farmers, only about 102 copies of the questionnaire were returned and used for our analysis. Although the 
return rate at about 41% is low, we do not consider that a problem due to the homogenous nature of the 
population of local dairy farmers. All the respondents were smallholders, none having more than 50 cattle 
heads. None also was an active member of any cooperative society, which depicts a clear lack of horizontal 
coordination among the local dairy farmers. Finally, a structured interview guide was used to collect data from 
the R&D/Dairy Development Unit of FCW, which was meant to provide deeper insights and clarifications 
on some of the claims raised in the company’s annual reports.
3.2 Procedure for data analysis
Specifically, we collected qualitative data on the institutional and infrastructural challenges constraining local 
value chain development in Nigeria, the nature of vertical integration practiced by FCW, and the structural 
defects in the DDP integration model. Using these information, we examined the existence or otherwise of 
rent-seeking behaviour in the dairy industry, the extent to which FCW participate in the formulation and 
enforcement of dairy policies and regulations in the country, the role of government in the promotion of local 
dairy chain, and the extent to which the FCW’s operations have affected local value chain development.
The analytical procedure adopted in the study is described in this section. In line with the requirements of 
triangulated research design, data collected from the four sources, most of which were qualitative, were 
compared to determine whether the claims were converging, contrasting, or complementary. We compared 
information collected from the company’s internal records (annual reports, structured interview, and official 
press releases) with those from external sources (e.g. smallholder dairy farmers, focus group discussion, 
and media reports). We grouped data arising from the annual reports and the interview with R&D/Dairy 
Development Unit of FCW in the same category to depict the official claims and positions of FCW. The 
converging views from these two sources were then benchmarked with the issues and concerns raised by 
stakeholders during the focus group discussion, as well as the opinions from the cattle farmers’ questionnaire. 
The results are as provided in the following section.
3.3 Findings and discussion
Findings from our triangulated sources generally reveal the persistent institutional and infrastructural challenges 
facing the local dairy industry in Nigeria, the widening distance between FCW operations and the smallholder 
dairy farmers in the local diary value chain, and the failed attempts at using DDP to mainstream smallholder 
farmers into the formal dairy value chain. In this section, we discuss the findings along these lines.
 ■ The institutional and infrastructural challenges
Findings from our analysis confirm the dominant thesis that major problem militating against the development 
of local dairy industry is the weakness in the existing institutional and infrastructure frameworks in the 
country, which allow a status quo that is detrimental to local production. Results from our triangulated data 
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for fresh milk in Nigeria. The same infrastructural deficiencies also complicate the processing of fresh milk 
in the country. The FCW’s 1997 annual report confirms that ‘there are still many hurdles to the distribution 
of our farm fresh dairy products.’ Confirming this, about 89% of the rural farmers who participated in the 
survey acknowledged not having idea of any government agricultural policies that had benefited them 
directly. Lack of basic amenities such as water and access to road is among the three factors that featured 
most frequently in the cattle farmers’ list of areas for assistance (Table 2). Others are healthcare for their 
cattle, and creation of more milk collection centres to further ease access.
We discovered, for instance, that from the beginning, FCW had its dairy farm in Jos (North central Nigeria), 
where its milk products produced in the farm were sold under the ‘farm fresh’ label. Due to distance and 
the absence of good transport and storage systems, it was however difficult to integrate the output of the 
company’s dairy farm in Jos into its milk processing facilities based in Lagos. Siting of the dairy farm at 
Jos is no doubt ideal as it allowed FCW proximity to greater population of local dairy farmers in the North. 
However, coordinating farming in the north and processing in the south proved financially unviable due to 
infrastructural challenges. Jos to Lagos is approximately 1000 kilometres. Without functional road, air or rail 
transport system, such coordination is rendered near impossible. A alter attempt by FCW to commercialize 
the farm was justified by an acknowledgement in the company’s annual report that the scheme ‘has been 
very costly considering the time and resources spent so far’. Commercializing of the farm however did little 
to improve its financial situation, due largely to high transaction costs.
 ■ Lack of effective integration
Findings from our study also show that from inception, the operations of FCW were loosely integrated into 
the local dairy value chain, and that there was no consistent effort by government to change this pattern. The 
R&D/Dairy Development manager in FCW had contended during our interview that despite the efforts of 
the company at enhancing the local value chain in the dairy industry, between 60 to 80% of the raw materials 
needed by WAMCO are imported, with a caveat that water, which constitutes a major component in dairy 
products was included as raw materials. A PricewaterhouseCoopers report corroborated this by emphasizing 
that FCW sourced only 3% of milk inputs form the local markets in 2016 (PWC, 2017). This trend, the report 
attributed to regulatory challenges, institutional constraints and the absence of government support, which 
forced the company to shift from backward to forward integration strategy. The shift was responsible for 
the collapse of the dairy farm programme and eventual return to the core business of importing powdered 
milk and reconstituting such into various milk products. That FCW could be allowed full grip of the market 
with imported milk and dairy products (Cf. Ilu et al., 2016) eventually became the basis for the Dutch parent 
Table 2. Responses of the dairy farmers on the benefits and gaps in the dairy development programme.1
Programme element Benefits Areas of further assistance
• Milk collection*





• Improved milk yields*
• Improved milk quality and 
hygiene
• Improved knowledge about 
dairy farming*
• Provision of basic amenities such as water and 
access roads from farms to the milk collection 
centres*
• Access to soft loans
• Provision of cross-breeding and exotic breeds
• Government interventions and assistance
• Free healthcare for the cows*
• Creation of additional milk collection centres 
closer to the farmers*
• Provision of dams for grazing
• Provision of means of transportation such as 
easier bikes
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company’s consistent increase in its shareholding in the Nigerian subsidiary. The shareholding was, for 
example, increased from 51% in 1997 (WAMCO, 1997) and to 67.81% in 2015 (FrieslandCampina, 2015).
In defense of its forward integration approach, the R&D/Dairy Development Manager maintained that 
Nigeria was a risky country for doing business, hence the focus on short-term investment strategy. Evidence 
from the FCW annual report validates this claim by emphasizing that to ‘limit these risks as far as possible 
FCW follows an active dividend policy in relation to these subsidiaries’ (FrieslandCampinat, 2014). Such 
dividend policy has resulted to a situation where the company has actively paid all its profits as dividends 
(Figure 2). Given its perception of the Nigerian business environment being risky, it became unlikely that 
the company would undertake investments with long term gestation in the country, and that it could unlikely 
reverse its dependence on imported raw materials.
The emergence of the DDP, which is similar to the Laiterie Du Berger (LDB)’s milk supply chain in Senegal 
(Wang et al., 2017) and the dairy hub framework uner the East African Dairy Development project (Rao 
et al., 2016), thus became a coping strategy for FCW (FrieslandCampina, 2011) to quell protest from local 
farmers and divert government’s attention from the needs of local value chain development.
 ■ The dairy development programme model
The DDP case validates the claim that the operations of FCW are loosely integrated, and that the absence of 
government intervention in the industry provide excusable basis for the importation of dairy products in the 
country. The company’s DDP was started in August 2010 as the first practical attempt at streamlining and 
developing the dairy farming sector in the country. Greater percentage of the DDP operations is concentrated 
in the South Western states to maintain proximity to Lagos, the operational headquarters of Friesland 
Campina. This design of the programme again implicates the insincerity of motives on the side of FCW. It 
points at an attempt to widen (rather than shrink) the spatial distance between its operational focus and the 
host country’s development goal.
Although the programme is designed to link independent smallholder cattle breeders to the milk collection 
facilities established by FCW, its concentration in the South Western region of the country runs contrary 
to the fact that greater percentage of the smallholder cattle farmers are located in the Northern region. The 
distance between cattle breeders and FCW milk collection centres, as illustrated in Figure 3, are further 
widened by the infrastructural challenges earlier discussed. Also, locating the facilities in the Southern region 
meant that a greater percentage of the smallholder farmers are automatically excluded from the scheme. It 
is therefore not surprising that the DDP model of intervention struggled to succeed under the conditions on 
which it was implemented.
Figure 2. Friesland Campina WAMCO (FCW) dividend profit after tax ratio. Computed from FCW annual 
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The disaggregated nature of smallholder dairy farmers participating in the DDP reflects in the results of 
our survey, where the farm size of majority of the respondents range from 1 to 4 hectares with about 44% 
holding less than one hectare and 27.5% holding between 1-2 hectares (Table 3).
Although the DDP was designed only to provide technical support to the farmers (FCW, 2016), the inherent 
cost of transacting along such model remains enormous. To confirm this, FCW in its 2010 annual report 
(FCW, 2010) stated clearly that the DDP was ‘an extremely challenging project as milk production in an 
industrial scale hardly exists in Nigeria.’ As expected, effective implementation of the programme was 
hampered by the uncluttered nature of the dairy farmers. The fact that of the 102 farmers that participated 
in the survey, none owned more than 50 cows corroborates this claim.
The DDP was without some benefits, despite its failed attempt at integrating smallholder farmers into a 
mainstream national value chain. As shown in Table 2, milk collection and artificial insemination are found 
to be the most prominent elements of the DDP. The participating farmers perceived increased income, 
improved milk yields, and improved knowledge of dairy farming as the major benefits they have received 
from the DDP project.
In essence, government’s support to the dairy farmers is almost non-existent, from the views of the farmers 
and responses generated from the focus group discussion. Where it exists, it is found to be highly unpopular. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that about 89% of the questionnaire respondents had no knowledge of any 
government agricultural policies nor benefitted from them. About 11% of the respondents had knowledge of 
the agricultural lending policy of the government, but indicated their inability to benefit from such facilities 
because of the rigidity of the processes involved.
It is important to note that the failure of the DDP is not because it was incompatible in the Nigerian context. 
It is more because of the technical defects in its design whereby its operations are concentrated outside of the 
mainstream cattle farming zones in the north. Although the programme enjoyed high degree of acceptability 
by the participating farmers, its sustainability was impaired by its clear lack of integration in the local dairy 
Figure 3. The dairy development programme model of milk collection and process.
Independent cattle breeders – 
mostly nomadic Hausa Fulanis  
Dairy (milk extracting) farmers – 
mostly the wives of the breeders  
The output market – mainly Nigeria 
and other West African countries  
FrieslandCampina milk
collection centre  
FrieslandCampina milk
processing factory  
Table 3. The distribution of farm size among the dairy farmers.
Response Number Percentage
Less than one hectare 45 44.1
Between 1-2 hectares 28 27.5
Between 2-4 hectares 9 8.8
Above 4 hectares 6 5.9
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value chain. Responding to the question on their relationship with FCW, the farmers were in consensus of 
having a good relationship with and benefited from the DDP. But this was only to the extent that FCW could 
afford to carry them along – an option that is constrained by high transaction costs and is considered less 
viable than the lucrative import-dependency approach.
Rather than promoting DDP as a sustainable business model, FCW opted for the option of running it as though 
it is part of its CSR strategies. As reported by one of the officials of the company during the focus group 
discussion, FCW buys their milk from the participating smallholder farmers at premium above prevailing 
market prices. Although it maintained that purchasing of milk from the farmers under the DDP scheme 
transformed the social and economic status of the local farmers, it is unclear how such social strategy can be 
sustained in a long-run. Instead, the approach heightened the suspicion that the commitment of the company 
to the scheme was just another CSR strategy for regulatory manoeuvring. Existing evidence from a similar 
setting proved that indeed CSR could be applied as a strategy to minimize the influence of public regulation 
and promote customized regulatory actions (Horowitz, 2015). Applying a case study of oil companies in 
Angola, Wiig and Kolstad (2010) indicted CSR as a strategic tool used by MNCs to secure licenses and 
contracts, and by so doing facilitate patronage problems.
Given the inherent lapses in the above integration model, it was not surprising that FCW chose to consolidate 
on its milk importation, processing and marketing. Rather than continuing to invest in the developing the 
local diary industry, the company adapted marketing strategy to the local specificities and structure of milk 
demand in Nigeria, which allowed it to largely import its dairy raw materials from the Netherlands and 
process same into end products locally in Nigeria (Business Day, 2019). This is only made possible because 
the government took no concrete policy steps over the years to discourage the importation of semi-finished 
and finished dairy products.
4. Conclusion and recommendations
In this study, we triangulated information from mixed sources to explain the consequences of the spatial issues 
around dairy farming and milk production in Nigeria. The findings show no clear regulatory instruments in 
place to promote or protect the local dairy industry in the country. They show that the DDP, in its original 
design, betrayed the suspicion that it was a CSR stunt to quell local tension and possibly divert policy 
attentions from the quest for backward integration. The impact of the programme is equally shown to have 
been overwhelmed by non-visibility of government support, which made the participating cattle farmers 
more dependent on FCW. This is confirmed in the practice where the company has to buy local milk from 
participating farmers at a premium above the prevailing market prices.
The dairy industry in Nigeria remains dominated by few foreign players and foreign dairy products; it is 
largely dependent on imported dairy inputs; lacks any meaningful integration of local farmers and investors in 
the national dairy value chain; and above all, remains without any sustainable form of government incentives 
and support. While the situation remains as it is, FCW profits and dominates the entire industry – controlling 
up to 75% of the total market share. The local milk content of its milk production in Nigeria remains at an 
infinitesimal level of 3%. The company continues to demonstrate that it has more incentive to support and 
lobby for the status quo than to push for policy and regulatory measures that support meaningful backward 
integration in the country. We find that for FCW, specifically, its preference for importation and persistent 
high dividend pay-out ratio combine to implicate the company in this conjecture. High dividend pay-out, 
leading to profit and capital repatriation, is also a form of rent-extraction. This, according to Fazekasa and 
Toth (2016) and Innes (2014), is a strong manifestation of the role of a state captor.
The foregoing dynamics can only change materially when government creates a conducive environment 
and/or when FCW gets involved in large scale dairy farming. We conclude along this line that although 
MNCs can help promote the development of local industries in host communities, the task of adopting and 
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is the responsibility of the host government and cannot be outsourced to foreign MNCs. Specifically, 
we recommend that for a sustainable backward integration to take place in the dairy industry in Nigeria, 
government should formulate and implement reasonable intervention schemes that ensure the provision of 
roads and water facilities, free healthcare for cattle, and creation of more milk collection centres to further 
ease dairy farming, improve yields and make milk collection and process easier. Given the rising rate of 
conflicts between herdsmen and local communities in most southern and north central parts of the country, 
a starting point (in the short term) will be for government to formulate a cattle farming and grazing policy 
that is acceptable to all the stakeholders in the downstream sector of the dairy industry. Creating a conducive 
atmosphere for cattle farming and local dairy production will then be followed with a long-term government 
policies that disincentivize importation and induce multi-stakeholder engagement in local dairy value chain 
development.
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